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Text: 
 
The issue of NATO ‘out-of-area’ operations: from West Africa to the borders 
of the Near East 
At its inception, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) purpose was to provide 
multilateral support for its signatories threatened by third-party aggression.[1] Its focus was on 
treaty- related actions in the Atlantic and Western Europe. As crises occurred in the early phases 
of the Cold War, questions surfaced in terms of how NATO should and could evolve to deal with 
them, even if they were of a non-military character, and if they took place outside of the areas of 
responsibility assigned to NATO by Article 6 of the Atlantic Charter. Arguments in favour of 
expanding NATO's mandate were justified as being part of the containment strategy, formulated 
in 1946 by American diplomat George F. Kennan, although Kennan himself had advocated 
political and economic containment.[2]  
In the mid-1950s, the limits of containment were tested when the USSR, under Soviet Premier 
Nikita Khrushchev, began to play a greater role in the Mediterranean by establishing closer 
military and economic ties with Middle Eastern and North African nations. As a show of force to 
counter USSR presence in the region, NATO held numerous naval manoeuvres throughout the 
Mediterranean, outside its original treaty-established limit, i.e. the Atlantic and Western 
Europe[3]. In 1952, naval exercises amounted to what became the largest armada to be 
assembled in the Mediterranean since the end of the Second World War under exercises Grand 
Slam and Longstep. During the autumn of 1952, exercise Mainbrace was the first large-scale 
naval exercise undertaken by one of NATO's two principal military commands, the newly 
established Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT).[4] In 1957, NATO held major exercises 
ranging from Norway to Turkey, known as Operation Counter Punch, Operation Strikeback and 
Operation Deep Water, all of which incorporated more than 250 000 men, 300 ships and 1 500 
aircraft.  
The operations of the 1950s presented Western European Union (WEU) with an opportunity to 
expand its role and to encourage increased coordination and cooperation with NATO.[5] The 
WEU Council reaffirmed that, notwithstanding the geographical limits imposed on NATO by 
Article 6 of the Atlantic Charter, it NATO interventions should not be limited to that area since it 
was committed to preserving a 'way of life'.[6] In the 1960s and 1970s, however, NATO 
exercises on such a large scale ceased and were replaced by the Naval On-Call Force 
Mediterranean (NOCFORMED), a rapid response naval force designed to respond to Soviet 
incursions in the Mediterranean.[7]  
In the mid-1960s, the addition of a political agenda to NATO's military objectives added another 
dimension to the debate about out-of-area interventions. In 1967, a report to the North Atlantic 
Council by Belgian Foreign Minister Pierre Harmel laid the groundwork for significant changes 
to NATO's mandate. His paper 'Future Tasks of the Alliance', delivered in December 1967, 
recommended that NATO should have a political track to promote dialogue and détente between 
NATO and Warsaw Pact countries.   
The fall of the dictatorships in southern Europe in the mid-1970s (Portugal – April 1974, Greece 
– July 1974 and Spain – November 1975) greatly benefited NATO in its bid to meet its strategic 
and political objectives as well. The fall of the dictatorships led to a decrease in public 
opposition to joint strategic initiatives with these countries, further increasing NATO's reach and 
further isolating the USSR in the Mediterranean. In April 1974, the dictatorship in Portugal fell, 
followed in July the Greek junta, which allowed NATO to continue relations with Greece with 
much less public and political opposition from other NATO members, as Greece had been a 
member of NATO since 1952. [8] Spain began the process of re-acquiring democracy in 
November 1975, as King Juan Carlos engaged in a rapid process of democratisation. These 
democratic developments allowed way NATO to have easy access to the region around Gibraltar 
to patrol the North Atlantic and to provide more bases 
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for NATO actions in the Western Mediterranean.[9]  
Within WEU (whose members were also members of NATO) NATO's 'out-of-area' interventions 
provided the opportunity for WEU to pursue their strategic objectives collectively, especially in 
regards to securing the supply of oil and pursuing stability in the Middle East. Out-of-area also 
assumed a prominent position in the articulation in Anglo-French relations in the 1960s and 
1970s. The British supported NATO's expanded role, but the French, while not directly opposing 
it, pursued an independent course, not tying their policies or interests to those of NATO but 
considering them in their own strategic planning. After the resignation of General de Gaulle on 
28 April 1969, his successor, Georges Pompidou, set about increasing cooperation with the US 
and Western Europe in the Mediterranean and Africa, and reconsidered British entry into the 
EEC, which had previously been vetoed twice.[10] Another factor that encouraged France to 
seek increased cooperation occurred when Algeria nationalised its oil in 1971. The French 
recognised their vulnerability to the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), 
the international organisation formed in Baghdad in 1960 to counter falling oil prices by 
regaining control over revenues in the major oil producing nations. The United Kingdom, along 
with many other Western states, were struck by the oil embargo, placed by the Arab members of 
OPEC on the states supporting Israel during the Yom Kippur War of 6 to 25 October 1973.  
Shared concerns about Western Europe's increasing marginalisation in the region, especially in 
relation to the superpowers’ predominant role, combined with increased Soviet activity there, 
and energy crises such as the oil shock of 1973, were reflected in the proceedings of WEU. For 
example, the Assembly called for recommendations dealing with security in the Mediterranean, 
but the WEU Council, stating that 'specialised international forums' (without specifying which 
forums these were) were already considering similar actions, declined to respond 'more fully' to 
the Assembly's request. [11]  
These crises and political changes showed the volatility of the Mediterranean region, and Soviet 
intervention in the region contributed to the impetus to provide a framework through which 
NATO could expand its role.  The British supported the expansion of NATO's mandates and 
pressed for the rest of the WEU members, not only to pledge political support but also to 
increase their military contributions.[12] For the French, as demonstrated by the removal of their 
armed forces from NATO's integrated command structure in 1966, NATO was too dominated by 
the US and UK to properly represent the interests of Western Europe. Therefore, while not 
opposing the expansion of NATO's area of interest, they maintained an independent but 
complementary course. This was later reflected in the WEU Assembly, with recommendations 
from the Assembly stating that France should be encouraged to play a greater role in the 
Mediterranean.[13] Where the British tended to align themselves with the US, NATO and Israeli 
position in the region, the French tended to assume a more neutral and at times pro-Arab stance, 
for example with de Gaulle declaring an arms embargo against Israel, on 2 June 1967, three days 
before the outbreak of the Six-Day War, and by the Pompidou government not supporting Israel 
during the Yom Kippur War of 6 to 25 October 1973. In so doing, the French avoided the OPEC 
oil embargo placed on many other western European states during the Yom Kippur war. For the 
British, aligning themselves with the US and Israel, did make them more vulnerable to energy 
shocks in the 1970s, and the fears over possible future shocks was the source of WEU assembly 
recommendations calling for peace in the region in order to secure access to energy. [14]  
The presence of the USSR in the Mediterranean  
In the 1950s, the USSR began to build up its naval and political presence in the Mediterranean 
and Middle East. This build-up was based on several considerations; as a response to NATO 
operations 
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such as Mainbrace, and Holdfast,[15] the USSR's desire to extend its influence beyond the Black 
Sea into the Mediterranean and the Middle East, and the use of the Soviet's 5th Operational 
Squadron operating in the Mediterranean, whose main function was to prevent large-scale 
NATO naval advances into the Black Sea.[16] The Soviets had also placed pressure on Turkey, 
as the Dardanelles were the Soviets’ sole point of access to the Mediterranean.  
The Suez Crisis (26 October to 22 December 1956) was one of the first events affected by the 
increased Soviet presence in the Mediterranean as the USSR's support of General Nasser allowed 
him the freedom to refuse Western assistance and financing. As a result of Nasser having 
accepted Soviet support, the US and Britain withdrew an offer to finance the building of the 
Aswan Dam, and on 26 July 1956, Nasser nationalised the Suez Canal.[17] In response, the 
British and French (with the Israelis) invaded Egypt to reassert their control over the shipping 
route, which had been paid for and administered by the French and British since the mid-19th 
century. Though they achieved their initial military objectives, the United Nations, USA and 
USSR placed pressure on France and Britain to withdraw, which they did by 22 December 1956, 
but the Israelis remained until 7 March 1957. Britain and France suffered a political and strategic 
setback as they failed in their attempts to remove Nasser from power and to regain control of the 
Suez Canal. The crisis was therefore a victory for Soviet policy by demonstrating to the Arab 
world that Soviet political and economic support in combination with rising Arab nationalism, 
could assist Arab states in achieving its strategic, political and economic objectives. However, 
the Soviets' increasing role in the region forced WEU to reconsider Western Europe's position in 
Mediterranean and Middle Eastern affairs, and while acknowledging the political threat and 
possible need to confront Soviet expansion, the WEU Council also stressed the importance of 
achieving peace in the region.[18]  
In addition to the national, regional and ethnic dimensions of the many conflicts in the Middle 
East throughout the Cold War, Soviet intervention contributed to the redistribution of power in 
the region. USSR continued to support Nasser by supplying Egypt, in addition to Syria and 
Jordan, with weapons leading up to and during the Six-Day War from 5 to 10 June, 1967.  They 
continued to support Arab nationalism, and provided economic, military and political aid to 
Libya in the late 1960s and early 70s as the country embarked on a nationalization campaign of 
Libya's oil. USSR also supported Nasser's successor, Sadat, before the Yom Kippur War in 1973.  
In combination with the continuing Soviet influence in the region, the use of energy as a political 
weapon by OPEC, highlighted the need for the US and Europe (through NATO and WEU) to 
coordinate their Middle Eastern policy to respond to Soviet influence and Arab nationalism.[19] 
The WEU Assembly pressed for a solution to the Yom Kippur War (of 6 to 25 October 1973) 
and the subsequent oil shock. The oil embargo placed on the nations supporting Israel by OPEC 
had caused oil prices to rise rapidly and significantly as supplies plummeted, and WEU 
examined the steps that could be taken to ensure European energy security, one of which was by 
placing an arms embargo on the combatant states.[20]  Additionally, the WEU Council affirmed 
WEU's commitment to strengthening the presence of NATO and France in the Mediterranean, 
and considered any further increases in Soviet naval forces and bases in the region as a threat to 
peace.[21]  
In 1974, the Soviets experienced a major setback in their Mediterranean policy when Anwar 
Sadat, who had succeeded Nasser as the leader of Egypt, established official relations with the 
US, refusing to accept any further Soviet assistance. The Yom Kippur War had shown that the 
US was a more reliable ally to its friends than the USSR was, and Arab victories against Israel 
had shown that a redistribution of power in the region was possible, despite Israel being 
militarily successful in the final phases of the conflict. Since only the US maintained diplomatic 
relations with all sides involved in the conflict, it was the US, not the USSR, which became the 
pre-eminent intermediary in the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East.  
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Also in 1974, NATO was confronted with a dual military and political crisis when Turkey 
invaded Cyprus. As a NATO member (it joined NATO in 1952) and having the largest military 
in the Mediterranean, Turkey was strategically vital to NATO strategy in the Mediterranean, and 
it remained in the Western sphere of influence. However, it had been in conflict with Greece 
(also a NATO member since 1952) over Cyprus since the 1950s, which placed a great strain on 
NATO's strategic unity in the Eastern Mediterranean. Moreover, Cyprus was important for the 
defence and security of Israel and was therefore part of the US strategy in the Middle East, but it 
was also vital for British strategic planning, as Britain had maintained a significant naval 
presence on the island since it had had to remove its bases in Egypt after the Suez crisis. As a 
result of these concerns, the WEU Assembly proposed a series of recommendations designed to 
encourage its members to adopt common positions calling for peace in regard to Mediterranean 
and Middle Eastern issues such as Cyprus, the Palestinian Liberation Organisation, Israel, 
Afghanistan and the Iran-Iraq War.[22]  
As Afghanistan was one of the last states in the region where the USSR had maintained a 
significant political, military and economic presence, the Soviets believed that it was vital to 
retain it in their sphere of influence. Soviet troops assisted the pro-soviet government at 
suppressing an Islamic revolution. However, once it became apparent that the revolution against 
the pro-Soviet Afghan government was largely successful, Soviet troops remained in the country 
in a counter-revolutionary role. It was at this point that their presence was labelled as an 
invasion. The West then assumed a much stronger opposition to the continuing Soviet presence 
there, and the UN issued a resolution condemning the continuing Soviet intervention in 
Afghanistan. The Afghan war, in combination with the Euromissile crisis, contributed greatly to 
ending the period of disarmament, and to a rapid reescalation of tensions between the USSR and 
the West.[23] The USA openly supported the Afghan resistance, but WEU debated whether or 
not it could intervene militarily by supplying weapons to the Mujahedeen. In 1981, the WEU 
Council affirmed that the crisis in Afghanistan was 'brought about by the Soviet military 
intervention', and emphasized the humanitarian nature of the crisis.[24] While WEU members 
contemplated taking action, voiced concerns over increases in the Soviet presence and 
interventions in the Mediterranean and Middle East, and advocated coordinating a response with 
the United States.[25] The secrecy around the issue of supplying weapons to the Afghan 
resistance, the Mujahedeen, was demonstrated by the reply of the WEU Council to a question 
from a British representative to the WEU assembly about the delivery of weapons to them. 
Though the Council acknowledged the need of the Afghan resistance 's need for arms, it did not 
provide detailed information in order to prevent the identification of specific weapons' 
sources.[26] What was learned in 2010 with the declassification of British documents, was that 
the secrecy was a result of a secret meeting between US, UK, French and West German 
representatives about discretely supplying arms to the Mujahedeen. Though the Germans were 
legally prohibited from selling arms, the other three agreed to do so.[27] This event was a good 
example of national policies influencing the WEU council and the distribution of information to 
the Assembly.  
Issues of security regarding the supply of energy  
The access to, security and transportation of energy had significant effects on British and French 
defence policy, not only within WEU but also within NATO. French and British energy 
concerns, while considering access to and security of uranium for nuclear weapons and reactors, 
were mainly focused on access to oil, and strategic competition over oil reserves remained 
intense throughout the Cold War.[28] Securing access to these reserves was therefore of 
paramount concern for both Britain and France considering their low levels of domestic 
production (notwithstanding their oil reserves), particularly when compared to the US and the 
USSR. The Suez Crisis (26 October to 22 December 1956) was one of the first events affected 
by the increased Soviet presence in the Mediterranean as the USSR's support of General Nasser 
allowed him the freedom to refuse Western assistance and 
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financing. As a result of Nasser having accepted Soviet support, the US and Britain withdrew an 
offer to finance the building of the Aswan Dam, and on 26 July 1956, Nasser nationalised the 
Suez Canal. [29] In response, the British and French (with the Israelis) invaded Egypt to reassert 
their control over the shipping route, which had been paid for and administered by the French 
and British since the mid19th century. Though they achieved their initial military objectives, the 
United Nations, USA and USSR placed pressure on France and Britain to withdraw, which they 
did by 22 December 1956, but the Israelis remained until 7 March 1957. Britain and France 
suffered a political and strategic setback as they failed in their attempts to remove Nasser from 
power and to regain control of the Suez Canal, but they did succeed in acquiring a treaty that 
would guarantee to keep the canal open at all times to ships of all nations. In the aftermath of the 
Suez crisis, and continuing in the 1960s, an aspect of WEU's role for Britain was the UK's 
attempt to increase the coordination of its energy policies with the six EEC members. For 
France, the threats to the country's energy supply began in 1971 when Algeria nationalised its oil 
and gas reserves. This shock to French energy supplies was followed by the embargo placed by 
Arab oil-producing nations on states supporting Israel during the Yom Kippur War in 1973. 
Though France was exempt from the embargo since it did not support Israel directly, the fear 
over depleting oil reserves caused rationing to take place in France nonetheless. The embargo 
rapidly raised energy prices in Britain as supplies diminished, and emphasised how closely 
energy supplies and security were linked. It also showed how energy could be used as a weapon 
and linked energy and security policy in the Mediterranean region with the rest of the world, 
highlighting the need to coordinate policy between themselves, WEU, NATO and the US for 
security and access to oil. [30]  
Despite attempting to create a unified Mediterranean security policy, Western Europe remained 
vulnerable to oil being used as a political weapon by Arab oil-producing states (Iraq, Kuwait, 
Libya, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates plus Egypt, Syria and Tunisia)  in times of 
turmoil in the region. Their awareness of this was demonstrated by debates within and 
recommendations from the Assembly calling on WEU members to increase and maintain 
strategic stockpiles of oil, and by recommendations from the Council for WEU members to 
coordinate action to encourage peace and security in the region.[31]  
Changes in technology such as super tankers capable of bypassing the Suez Canal, together with 
developments in non-Middle Eastern sources of oil such as in the Irish and North Seas, in North 
Africa and the USSR and with deep water oil drilling, reduced but did not eliminate the pressure 
to guarantee access to Middle Eastern oil. The French and British usually dealt with their energy 
concerns on a unilateral basis, using WEU as a forum to inform the members of their actual or 
intended courses of action. However, the WEU Council did endorse an Assembly 
recommendation to enhance and maintain stability in the Gulf area in order protect Western 
European energy interests.[32]  
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